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OFFSTAGE BEHAVIOR:
REAL JURORS' SCRUTINY OF
NON-TESTIMONIAL CONDUCT
Mary R. Rose* and Shari Seidman Diamond**
INTRODUCTION
For almost as long as it has been possible to consider ways to record
trials on film, people have imagined the benefits of doing so. In 1930,
Judge Jerome Frank wrote in Law and the Modern Mind:
It is no easy task for the judge to bring together in his mind, for the
purpose of finally reaching his conclusions as to facts, what is fre-
quently a voluminous body of testimony.... It may well be that the
courts will some day adopt a recent mechanical innovation and that
we shall have "talking movies" of trials which will make possible an
almost complete reproduction of the trial so that the judge can con-
sider it at his leisure.1
Judge Frank saw the promise of "mechanical innovation" for help-
ing judges arrive at verdicts in bench trials. The trial before the fact
finder would remain live; a recording of it would permit a judge to
revisit and review information previously presented. In more recent
years, innovations in and discussions about the possible uses of case
videorecordings have not abated. In Kentucky, for instance, vide-
orecordings constitute the official record of the case that appeals
courts use for review. 2 Michigan permits a digital or audio recording
to serve as the official record of a trial, although appellate courts still
routinely review from a transcript made from the tape, rather than
from the tape itself.3 As we imagine litigation in the year 2020, we
* Assistant Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Texas at Austin.
** Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Northwestern Univer-
sity Law School; Research Professor, American Bar Foundation.
1. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118 n.9 (Peter Smith 6th ed. 1970) (empha-
sis omitted).
2. See William E. Hewitt, Video Court Reporting: A Primer for Trial and Appellate Judges,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 2, 5.
3. For a history of Michigan's adoption of video technology, which emerged through Michigan
Supreme Court Administrative Orders, see MICHIGAN VIDEO COURTROOM USERS GROUP,
VIDEO RECORD SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL (2002), available at http://courts.michigan.
gov/scao/resources/publications/manuals/Video-02-mnl.pdf. Under Michigan rules, the video-
tape provides different avenues for creating a written record. For example, indigent clients
whose trials were videotaped can hire non-certified transcribers to create a written transcript of
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consider the possibility that courts will feel the pull of the Digital Age
to an even greater extent. Perhaps digital recordings of trials for ap-
pellate review could become the norm for all state and federal courts.
Or, in theory, an entirely "virtual trial," in which decision makers hear
evidence wholly or mostly from pre-recorded sources, could become a
reality.4
There are a host of possible costs and benefits associated with such
moves. 5 Here we discuss one implication in detail. We follow others
in noting that pre-recorded testimony and presentation risks eliminat-
ing-for decision makers at either the trial or appellate level-some
alternative channels of communication that are available in the live
trial, in particular the opportunity to observe how people behave
when they are not testifying or otherwise formally addressing the deci-
sion maker.6 Some have suggested that eliminating the chance to see
the trial. MICH. CT. R. 8.108(G)(1)(c) (1985). For a discussion of appellate practice and court
transcripts, see Richard Ryan Lamb, Using Video Recording as a Component in Managing Your
Court, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsconline.org/d-tech/ctc/showarticle.asp?
id=109 (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
4. See, e.g., Robert L. Rothman, Digital Trials in a Digital World, LITIG., Summer 2008, at 1, 2.
In some instances, jurors are already permitted to hear witnesses testify via closed circuit televi-
sion (CCTV). See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Compared to criminal cases, there
are more circumstances in which jurors in civil cases can hear witnesses testify via videoconfer-
encing or pre-recorded testimony. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit
videoconferencing "for good cause shown in compelling circumstances and upon appropriate
safeguards." FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). For historical examples of using pre-recorded video tape
trials, see Gordon Bermant, The Development and Significance of Courtroom Technology: A
Thirty-Year Perspective in Fast Forward Mode, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 621 (2005).
5. For a discussion of recordings for appellate review, see Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather,
Thawing Out the "Cold Record": Some Thoughts on How Videotaped Records May Affect Tradi-
tional Standards of Deference on Direct and Collateral Review, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 411
(2000). For a discussion of videoconferencing in pretrial phases, see Douglas L. Colbert et al.,
Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23
CARDoZo L. REV. 1719 (2002). For discussions of the use of videoconferencing or recorded
trials for fact finders, see GERALD R. MILLER & NORMAN E. FONTEs, VIDEOTAPE ON TRIAL: A
VIEW FROM THE JURY Box (1979); Bermant, supra note 4; Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil
Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (1998); Nancy S.
Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1257 (2001); Michael D. Roth, Laissez-Faire Videoconferencing: Remote Witness Testimony
and Adversarial Truth, 48 UCLA L. REV. 185 (2000); Rothman, supra note 4; Elizabeth C. Wig-
gins, What We Know and What We Need to Know about the Effects of Courtroom Technology, 12
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731 (2004).
6. See Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through Screens, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 769, 783-84 (2004), discussed infra at notes 60-65 and accompanying text. In 1998, an
appeals court in Tennessee refused an invitation to review a videotape of a trial in order to make
an independent determination of witness credibility, stating, "while the video recording may
capture a witness while he or she is testifying, the recording does not preserve the conduct of
other participants in the trial or even spectators in the courtroom that may be the cause of the
witness's demeanor, voice inflections, or body language." Mitchell v. Archibald, 971 S.W.2d 25,
29-30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
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witnesses and others through the trial would lead to fewer biases and
extraneous influences on decision making.7 Others have suggested
that some decisions may not be as accurate without being informed by
the entirety of the live trial. 8
In this Article, we consider what jurors and judges do when they
observe trial participants' behavior that is not part of the official court
record and does not come from the witness stand, the judge's bench,
or the attorney's podium. In an analysis of the discussions and delib-
erations of fifty real civil juries, we elsewhere dub these reactions "off-
stage" observations. 9 We summarize those results and also compare
those juror behaviors with instances of similar behavior by judges in
reported cases reviewed by appellate courts. We then consider the
implications of our data and these rulings for the prospect of recorded
trials.
In Part II, we describe the questions about offstage access that re-
corded trials raise, and we discuss potential problems and benefits as-
sociated with the ability to view the offstage regions in live trials. 10
Part III then discusses what we have learned about jurors' attention to
the offstage from our intensive examination of what jurors discuss
during pre-trial discussions and deliberations.11 That research showed
that offstage attention is routine in trials, in the sense that most cases
included at least one instance of juror discussion about the offstage. 12
At the same time, however, such observations had a clearly
subordinate role in deliberations.13 Part III also offers some addi-
tional insight into offstage observation by comparing the types of in-
formation that the Arizona civil jurors discussed to instances of
judicial use of offstage observations in written opinions. 14 We note
that the rulings by reviewing courts not only confirm the courts' am-
bivalence toward offstage observations but also highlight the natural
7. See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 573, 614-21 (2008).
8. Gertner, supra note 6, at 786.
9. Our detailed analysis appears in Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Kimberly M.
Baker, Goffman on the Jury: Real Jurors' Attention to the "Offstage" of Trials (Feb. 1, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors; this manuscript is currently in the process of
revision and review for publication). The notion of an "offstage" region at trial refers to the fact
that courtrooms are open spaces, much like a theater in the round. In such theaters, actors who
are not performing on stage wait just "offstage" in darkened aisles, at the back of the theater, or
sometimes out in the hallways of the theater.
10. See infra notes 19-65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 66-205 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 108-126 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 127-205 and accompanying text.
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pull people feel toward some types of offstage observation. 15 Part IV
considers the potential for "virtual trials" and for a video record for
appeals in light of these findings.' 6 We argue that, at least for civil
cases, appellate courts reviewing trials would likely lose little signifi-
cant information if pre-recorded testimony partially occluded or
wholly omitted the offstage; with respect to virtual trials before juries,
we consider some effects that are more difficult to measure and pre-
dict empirically.' 7 We suggest that using taped trials for appellate re-
view would have the advantage of maximizing legally relevant
information and minimizing legally irrelevant information, even
though some arguably useful information might be lost.18
II. POSSIBLE USES OF A "VIRTUAL TRIAL"
Even a simple foray into new technology-permitting a video re-
cord of a case to serve as the "official" record for appeal-raises sig-
nificant questions about exactly what appellate courts should be able
to see in a trial. As a practical matter, courts that opt to record a trial
must decide how to position the camera to adequately capture the
event, which requires a decision about what information is significant
for decision makers: how much of the courtroom should the "record"
depict? Should the video record depict only the witness stand and the
attorney podium? Should someone watching the tape be able to see
the judge at all times?1 9 What about those seated at counsels' tables?
Should a trial audience be visible?20 Such questions would also be
implicated, and perhaps magnified, if courts were to consider cur-
tailing, or even eliminating, the live trial. For example, courts could
expand the use of taped or videoconferenced testimony21 or, as some
have suggested, permit jurors (perhaps at their leisure) to watch an
15. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 206-220 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 209-219 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
19. Appellate courts have had to decide if a judge's non-verbal behavior during trial-for
example, scowling or saying "hmmph" while a witness is testifying-might have prejudiced a
jury. For a review of these cases, see Peter David Blanck, Robert Rosenthal & LaDoris Hazzard
Cordell, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury
Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985).
20. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006) (considering whether buttons worn by
family members of the alleged victim prejudiced the jury); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560
(1986) (considering whether four uniformed state troopers, seated in the first row behind the
defendant, prejudiced the jury).
21. Gertner, supra note 6, at 784, 786.
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entirely pre-recorded trial in which witnesses, attorneys, or judges ap-
pear before the jury on tape rather than in person.22
In deciding what decision makers should be able to observe, the
superficially simple answer is that a trial record should capture the
evidence, argument, and instruction that occurs "in court," just as jury
instructions state.23 Edited trials might even excise testimony that has
been the subject of a sustained objection or that the judge in a live
trial instructs the jury to ignore. However, both modern day courts
and scholars like Wigmore have suggested that the trial offers legiti-
mate forms of information not encompassed by admitted evidence in
the trial record. For example, in Culver v. Astrue,24 the plaintiff in a
disability hearing claimed daily chronic pain at a high level, and the
administrative law judge concluded that the plaintiff's description of
her pain levels was not fully credible, in part because the judge "ob-
served no discomfort during a forty-five-minute hearing. '25 In re-
viewing the decision, the district court found this observation one of
several "permissible reasons to discount her credibility."2 6
Wigmore described three types of evidence: direct, circumstantial,
and autoptic, or "real" evidence. 27 The tribunal's belief based on au-
toptic evidence arises from direct self-perception, or autopsy, of the
thing itself.28 Wigmore suggested that a fact finder's observations of a
criminal defendant in the courtroom, even when the defendant was
not on the witness stand, could provide the judge or jury with relevant
information.2 9 Courts have debated this perspective and whether
some "offstage" behavior should be construed as relevant evidence.
For example, in United States v. Schuler, the defendant was arrested
22. Rothman, supra note 4, at 2; Carrington, supra note 5, at 1293.
23. Arizona Pattern Instructions in civil cases state: "You will decide what the facts are from
the evidence presented here in court. That evidence will consist of testimony of witnesses, any
documents and other things received in evidence as exhibits, and any facts stipulated, or agreed
to, by the parties or which you are instructed to accept." STATE B. OF ARIZ., REVISED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 5 (4th ed. 2005). For more general discussions of what constitutes evi-
dence at trial, see ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999); Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 604 (1994).
24. No. 07-C-643, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66432 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2008); see also Powers v.
Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 2000).
25. Culver, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66432, at *9.
26. Id. Courts approving the use of offstage observations have been more likely to accept
them as legitimate when they are used to consider specific claims a party makes, or when a party
in a civil case has made his credibility an issue by taking the stand. See infra notes 127-205 and
accompanying text.
27. 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 24 (Peter Tillers
rev. ed. 1983).
28. Id. § 1151 (providing examples of a person's height or complexion).
29. Id.
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for shoplifting items from a department store. 30 During questioning
for this, he allegedly threatened the life of then-President Ronald
Reagan. 31 At that time, Schuler also allegedly "began a tirade of
name calling, racial slurs, and assorted vulgar comments. '32 The first
trial ended in a mistrial.33 At the second trial, the prosecutor empha-
sized to the jury that Schuler was serious about his threats (i.e., that he
was not venting his anger, as the defense maintained):
While Mr. Schuler was being interrogated by the two security
agents, Schuler made a number of racial comments about the num-
ber of people he was going to kill, a number of sexual comments. I
noticed a number of you were looking at Mr. Schuler while that
testimony was coming in and a nunmber of you saw him laugh and
saw him laugh as they were repeated. 34
Although the defense objected, the judge not only overruled the
objection but also instructed the jury that the argument was proper. 35
The appellate court split 2-1 in overturning Schuler's conviction. 36
The majority ruled that the statement in closing argument injected in-
formation about bad character when the defendant had not intro-
duced evidence of good character, a violation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(a). 37 The appellate court also ruled that nontestifying
demeanor is not a form of evidence and, absent a curative instruction
to the jury, that it is possible that the defendant was convicted on
something other than evidence adduced at trial, which the court held
to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 38
In dissent, Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall disagreed and argued that
off-the-stand demeanor was not evidence:
Sound policy reasons exist for allowing a jury to consider the court-
room demeanor of a defendant. As Wigmore noted: "It is as un-
wise to attempt the impossible as it is impolitic to conduct trials
upon a fiction; and the attempt to force a jury to become mentally
blind to the behavior of the accused sitting before them involves
both an impossibility in practice and a fiction in theory."'39
30. United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 1987).
31. Id. (Schuler allegedly threatened that when Reagan came to town, Schuler would "get
him.").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 982-83.
37. Id. at 980-81; see FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
38. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 981.
39. Id. at 983 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 274 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1979)).
[Vol. 58:311316
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Judge Hall argued that the defendant's demeanor was relevant be-
cause the jury had to decide whether or not the defendant was serious
or possibly joking when making the threat against the president. 40 Be-
cause evidence of "other acts" can speak to issues of intent under Fed-
eral Rule 404(b), Judge Hall argued that it would not be improper for
the jury to consider the defendant's behavior in court.41
As Professor Laurie Levenson noted in a recent review of this and
other criminal cases involving off-the-stand behavior, subsequent
criminal appeals have done little to settle the original split in the Schu-
ler court.42 This divide seems understandable if, as according to Lev-
enson, there are differing views of "what decision-making roles we
want to give to jurors. '43 In one view, permitting off-the-stand obser-
vations to act as evidence in a case would undermine the distinct jobs
we assign to judges (who decide what evidence is permitted in the
case) and jurors (who draw conclusions only from what the judge has
explicitly permitted them to consider in court).4 4 Levenson noted that
modern trial procedures have long abandoned the practice of viewing
jurors as compurgators-that is, those who know the defendant well
and who, in essence, act simultaneously as witnesses and jurors in a
case.
45
Jurors' offstage observations are also difficult to monitor and con-
trol.46 Judges may not see the behavior in question, and, indeed there
is never any guarantee that the entire jury panel will observe such
conduct. 47 Further, given individual variability in how people express
themselves non-verbally, Levenson questioned jurors' abilities to cor-
40. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 984.
41. Id. at 984-85 (stating there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the jury to consider the
laughter).
42. Levenson, supra note 7, at 603-06 (finding that courts have sometimes ruled remarks were
improper). See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 572 (Del. 1981) (prosecutor stated that the
defendant was "unemotional, unfeeling, and without remorse"); Bryant v. State, 741 A.2d 495,
499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (prosecutor stated that defendant kept looking down and could
not look at the witness); State v. Brown, 358 S.E.2d 1, 15 (N.C. 1987) (also finding that some
reviewing courts have not objected when prosecutors note that a defendant sat "coolly . .. mus-
ing, watching, calculating" while a witness broke down and sobbed on the stand).
43. Levenson, supra note 7, at 614.
44. Id. at 615 ("[A]llowing jurors to consider their perceptions of the defendant was no longer
reliable or consistent with the nature of formalized proceedings in which the judge closely regu-
lates what evidence jurors may consider.").
45. Id.
46. Id. ("There is little way for the court to monitor and control such observations by jurors
.... 1 .
47. Id. at 618 ("One juror's quick glimpse of the defendant may carry undue weight during the
jurors' discussions. It will be extremely difficult for the trial and appellate courts to police the
use of demeanor evidence unless each glance or movement is noted for the record.").
2009]
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rectly interpret the meaning of offstage demeanor. 48 As she ex-
plained, most people have difficulty correctly interpreting ambiguous
nonverbal behavior,49 and they may not correctly recognize when con-
duct is being staged and manipulated for their benefit.50 At the same
time, most people are overly confident that they can effectively parse
and interpret nonverbal behavior, for example, to determine if some-
one is being deceitful. 51 Allowing jurors to interpret the defendant's
behavior in court may also lead them to mistakenly believe they are
free to interpret and make inferences about the behavior of others in
the courtroom.52
But a different view of the jury's role and trustworthiness both em-
braces the entirety of the live trial and allows for some amount of
offstage observation. Levenson suggested that with proper instruc-
tions, jurors could learn how to treat offstage information appropri-
ately and that they would be "capable of distinguishing between
innocuous behavior and that which is relevant to their understanding
of the facts of a case."'5 3 She also argued that jurors, aware of the
dynamics of an adversary trial, are "capable of understanding that a
defendant will likely fake [some] reactions in court. '5 4 Further, al-
though jurors are not compurgators and must decide cases using evi-
dence presented in court, it is impractical to tell them to ignore their
court observations 55 when jury instructions tell jurors to base verdicts
in part on "common sense and life experience. '5 6 Finally, Levenson
argued that the "most persuasive reason" to allow considerations of a
defendant's demeanor is because "the theater of the courtroom mat-
48. Id. at 616.
49. Levenson, supra note 7, at 616.
50. Id. at 617 ("[Tlhere is the constant risk that lawyers will coach their clients on how to
communicate with jurors without testifying.").
51. Id. at 616-17.
52. Id. All of the above arguments in favor of instructing jurors to ignore off-the-stand de-
meanor apply to both criminal and civil cases. In her article, Levenson also discussed rationales
that are more significant for criminal cases, such as clients' reluctance to speak in whispers to
their attorneys during trial, lest it be misinterpreted; most courtroom demeanor observations go
to character, which should not be the issue that determines guilt or innocence; and permitting
off-the-stand behavior to influence verdicts contradicts a Fifth Amendment right not to testify
(and, conversely, defendants who do not take the stand should not be able to communicate back
channel with the jury). Id. at 619-20.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id. at 626.
55. Levenson, supra note 7, at 624.
56. Id. at 625.
318 [Vol. 58:311
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ters. '' 57 Trials occur in open courtrooms, which have a certain "natu-
ral dynamic. '58 Therefore, Levenson concluded that
the verdict should reflect the jurors' evaluation of the evidence, as it
makes sense in light of what they have observed firsthand about the
person they have been asked to judge. Courtrooms are not labora-
tories; they are halls of judgment where "jurors confront a real, live
defendant and real-life consequences. 59
In this view, something is lost in the distance between observer and
target that a taped trial creates. In the extreme, this view suggests that
firsthand observation, including offstage activity, leads to better judg-
ment. Judge Nancy Gertner suggested this possibility in describing
the mixed feelings she has about permitting testimony through vide-
oconference in her courtroom.60 Videoconferenced testimony has
many merits, including the potential to solve difficult problems such as
hearing from witnesses who live far away (even outside of the United
States) 6a and minimizing the stress some children experience over tes-
tifying in sexual abuse cases. 62 At the same time, Gertner also noted
that "in live testimony, face-to-face transmission plainly increases the
information available to the fact-finder. ' 63 She cited not only social
science studies on the clues that people pay attention to in deciding
whether someone is lying (some of which might not be as evident in
videoconferenced testimony), 64 but also anecdotal evidence:
In a telling scene in the movie "Twelve Angry Men," the jurors were
discussing the testimony of an old man who claimed to have heard a
fight in the apartment above him, and then a loud noise, like a body
hitting the floor. He reported that he ran to his apartment door just
in time to see the defendant running down the stairs. One of the
jurors, himself an elderly man, reminded the others about the way
the elderly witness had walked to the stand before testifying; drag-
ging one of his feet, he walked in a labored fashion, his gait slowed
by some disability. It was an observation that would have been
missed if the only aspect of the witness that the jurors saw was his
face.65
57. Id. at 627.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 628.
60. See Gertner, supra note 6.
61. Id. at 773 ("I have watched [videoconferencing] transform a complex antitrust trial that
was dependent upon a witness at a distant location, beyond the reach of the court's subpoena
power.").
62. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
63. Gertner, supra note 6, at 786.
64. Id. (citing research showing that facial expressions-i.e., that which would be most easily
displayed via videoconference-are the least informative about deception because they are the
easiest to control).
65. Id. at 783-84.
2009] 319
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Examples like this suggest that decision quality may erode when ju-
rors lose access to information occurring away from the witness stand.
III. EMPIRICAL ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING OFFSTAGE CONDUCT
As we have shown, as a normative matter, there is room for debate
as to how appropriate it is for jurors to pay attention to conduct that
occurs in front of them but is not submitted formally as evidence.66
But the debate itself raises a host of empirical questions that have not
been adequately addressed in either the legal or social science litera-
tures. Most basically, the belief that something would be "missing"
from decision making if people could not see the offstage behavior of
witnesses assumes that jurors now routinely turn to this area to inform
their conclusions. 67 To date, no systematic data exist to examine how
often and in what ways jurors use the offstage region. 68 We recently
had the unique opportunity to address this gap by observing the actual
deliberations of fifty civil juries. 69 In this Part, we summarize the
study method and results, and we also link the issues jurors find of
interest to those that have come up in appeals of judicial rulings.70
Further details of this analysis can be found in our manuscript. 71
A. A Method for Studying Offstage Comments in Real
Jury Deliberations
Our ability to study offstage observations in actual jury discussions
and deliberations came about because the State of Arizona sought to
66. See supra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
67. Levenson, for example, wrote that jurors scrutinize "every move" of a criminal defendant
in court, "attaching deep importance to a quick glance or passing remark." Levenson, supra
note 7, at 575. Further, some trial consultant handbooks emphasize the need for lawyers to pay
attention to small details of how they behave during, for example, breaks in trial. For example,
one book explained that plaintiffs and criminal defense attorneys should rebuff any attempts by
the other side to be friendly toward one another. LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORET-rA A. MALAN-
DRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 540 (1985).
68. Just one study has examined jurors' attention to offstage behavior through interview data.
Researchers used data from the Capital Jury Project to predict death sentences on the basis of
how people talked about defendant's demeanor in court. Former jurors who rated a defendant
as looking "bored" during a trial were significantly less likely to also say that the defendant had
remorse. Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The
Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1617 (1998). In cases that
were low on "viciousness," remorse predicted sentences (defendant's demeanor by itself was not
analyzed as a predictor of sentences). Id. at 1636.
69. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary R. Rose, Leslie Ellis & Beth Murphy,
Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1
(2003).
70. See infra notes 72-205 and accompanying text.
71. Rose et al., supra note 9.
320
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evaluate its innovative practice of allowing civil .jurors to discuss evi-
dence mid-trial during morning, lunch, and afternoon breaks or other
periods when the jury is assembled together in the jury room. 72 A
court order permitted researchers to recruit jurors and cases to par-
ticipate in a study in which both trial testimony and jury discussions
and deliberations would be videotaped. 73 Nearly all jurors (95%) ap-
proached about the study agreed to participate. 74 Attorneys and par-
ties were less willing to permit their case to be enrolled in the study,
with a response rate of 22%. Despite this lower participation rate, the
cases in the data set closely matched the profile of the types of cases
on the Pima County docket during the same time period. In the sam-
ple, 52% (n = 26) of trials were motor vehicle cases, 34% (n = 17)
were wrongful injury cases not involving a motor vehicle, 8% (n = 4)
were medical malpractice cases, and 6% (n = 3) were contract cases.
Cases varied from the common rear-end collision with a claim of soft
tissue injury to cases involving severe and permanent injury or
death.75
The videotapes of the trials permitted us to generate "roadmaps" of
the case, which described who testified, when in the course of the trial
the witness appeared, and, in detailed summary form, the content of
72. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(f) (2000). The law requires that all jurors be present for discussion,
though Diamond and colleagues found that jurors did not strictly observe this rule. Diamond et
al., supra note 69, at 28 (finding discussion about the case occurred in 27.9% of the average
number of ten-minute periods-4.49 out of 16.1 periods-that jurors had available for discussion
when not all jurors were present). Jurors are also told not to arrive at any conclusions about the
case before all the evidence had been presented to them; analyses indicate that jurors offered
premature statements on the verdict in just 11% of discussion periods. Id. at 58.
73. Sup. Ct. of Ariz. Admin. Order 98-10 (Feb. 5, 1998), available at http://www.supreme.
state.az.us/orders/admorder/orders99pdf989810.pdf. In this study, one-third of the cases were
assigned to a "No Discuss" condition, in which Rule 39(f) was suspended for these cases. The
remaining thirty-seven cases received the typical instruction that allowed them to discuss the
evidence. To tape trial testimony, arguments, and instructions, a camera in the courtroom was
focused on the witness box. When cameras malfunctioned or were not turned on, we obtained
the trial transcript. We also obtained copies of documentary exhibits. To record discussion and
deliberation in the jury rooms, two unobtrusive cameras were mounted at the ceiling level in
opposite corners of the deliberation rooms. These cameras made it possible to see jurors seated
around the rectangular table on a split screen without disrupting their normal seating arrange-
ment. Unobtrusive ceiling microphones recorded the discussions. An on-site technician was
instructed to tape the conversations in the jury room whenever at least two jurors were present.
For more detail, see Diamond et al., supra note 69.
74. We recruited a total of 402 jurors. Roughly half (53%) were female, 70% were white, and
30% were minorities (primarily Hispanic). A quarter (25%) of the sample reported annual
household incomes of less than $20,000, 41% reported between $20,000 and $49,000, and 39%
reported earnings of $50,000 or more. Rose et al., supra note 9.
75. For details on how cases differed across the "Discuss" and "No Discuss" conditions, see
Diamond et al., supra note 69.
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the testimony.76 These roadmaps were crucial for knowing the identi-
ties of witnesses versus non-witnesses, and for isolating whether jurors
discussed behavior that most likely occurred while people were "on
stage" (e.g., testifying) or whether the comment could refer only to an
instance when people were clearly "offstage. ' 77 We then examined
the transcripts of deliberations and the quasi-transcripts of discussion
periods to identify offstage remarks.78
We defined "offstage" to include the types of observations that di-
vided the court in United States v. Schuler79 (i.e., how a party behaves
when listening to others' testimony), as well as activities that in all
likelihood no court would regard as acceptable material for an eviden-
tiary discussion (e.g., how someone looked while he or she was riding
in the elevator with a juror).80 This broad coding was designed to cap-
ture all of the types of offstage information that jurors might notice.
For parties, fact witnesses, and expert witnesses, we included in off-
stage observations those behaviors they engaged in during periods
when they were not testifying on the witness stand.81 For attorneys,
we counted all references to attorney behavior other than that which
occurred when they were addressing the jury, the witnesses, or the
judge (e.g., activities other than speaking during jury selection, argu-
ing to the jury, questioning a witness, or making a motion to the
judge).82 For judges, offstage activity reflected judicial behavior that
was unrelated to giving instructions to the jury or responding to coun-
sel by ruling on objections.8 3 If jurors remarked on family members,
on friends, or on anyone else who did not testify in the case, we
counted this as an offstage observation. 84 Coders had to be certain
that a juror's remark reflected offstage activity; ambiguous instances
(e.g., a comments occurring on days when someone spent time both
on and off the stand) were not included in our tally.85 This rule lim-
ited the number of juror comments that pertained to people's clothing
76. Id. at 19-20.
77. Id.
78. Our data set has verbatim transcripts of all deliberations in these cases. For discussions,
we have "quasi-transcripts" which are not fully verbatim but are highly detailed as to speaker
and content. The more condensed form expedited our analyses regarding the discussion innova-
tion. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 10 n.2. For this project, when we located offstage remarks
during discussion periods, we examined the tape to check the actual language when the gist or
valence of the comment was not clear from the quasi-transcript.
79. 813 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1987).
80. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 10-11.
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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and attire, since the coder had to be certain that the juror viewed what
someone wore exclusively in an offstage context. 86
Coders also identified the physical area in which the observation
took place, so that we knew if the remark referred to behavior in the
courtroom versus activity in the courthouse but not in the courtroom
(e.g., in an elevator or bathroom) or outside of the courthouse entirely
(e.g., in the courthouse parking lot or at a nearby restaurant). 87 Fi-
nally, we also coded whether the remark was "valenced"-that is,
whether it favored the positions of one party or another.88
B. Results Summary: A Numerical Profile of Offstage Talk
We have suggested that an empirical examination of how jurors cur-
rently make use of the offstage informs the proposition that some-
thing might be "missing" if decision makers could not see offstage
areas.89 An absence of offstage information would constitute a sub-
stantial loss of information, legitimate or not, if jurors were found to
devote significant amounts of time and attention to discussing the off-
stage, and if such information significantly affected how they talked
about other pieces of ("front-stage") evidence or affected jurors'
views of the overall persuasiveness of one party of the other.90 We
turn now to how frequently jurors talked about the offstage and then
to how the Arizona juries treated this information, in particular
whether offstage activities appeared to shift the groups' positions on
the cases.
1. The Frequency of Offstage Observations
In one sense, conversations about the offstage was routine in these
civil jury trials. Forty of the fifty cases (80%) included at least one
offstage observation.91 At the same time, when considered in the con-
text of the entire data set, the total number of remarks was low. In all,
we coded 303 total offstage remarks about parties, witnesses, attor-
86. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 10-11.
87. Id. at 11.
88. We coded valenced remarks as those that one of the parties would, and the opposing party
would not, want a juror to make. Id. Remarks could be coded as valenced for plaintiff, valenced
for the defendant, or valenced for both. Id. To establish that coders were viewing valenced
remarks similarly, two independent coders read two full transcripts. We totaled the number of
agreements for a given category (e.g., valenced for plaintiff), multiplied this number by two, and
divided this product by the sum of the frequency with which each coder used that category in the
transcript. See id. at 11 n.3.
89. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 108-126 and accompanying text.
91. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 13.
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neys, judges, and non-witness observers of the trial. 92 To put the total
number of observations in perspective, we coded a total of 2502 pages
of quasi-transcripts from discussion periods and 5276 pages of deliber-
ation transcripts for the fifty trials.93 Talk about the offstage thus ap-
peared on only 3.9% of the pages we reviewed (assuming one
comment per page, 303 pages divided by 7778). Of note, this total
count concerns the entirety of the trial: pre-deliberation discussions,
deliberations, and post-deliberation discussions. 94 Looking only at the
most crucial decision-making period-the formal deliberations that
took place after the jury viewed the trial and was instructed on the
law-the number of remarks is particularly low, with jurors in twenty-
three cases offering a total of just seventy-two offstage observations
during deliberations. 95
Moreover, not all of the comments were relevant to the judgments
the juries had to make in the cases. A remark was most likely to have
potential implications for decision making if the remark was valenced
in favor of one party or the other. 96 Of the roughly 300 observations,
a majority (51%) had no valenced implication for either party.97 For
example, during discussions, jurors in seventeen different cases made
a total of thirty-nine offstage observations about the judge.98 A sub-
stantial number of these comments simply noted that the judge was
less than wholly observant during the trial-e.g., sleeping or fighting
off sleep, looking bored, or, in one instance, paying bills. 99 Other non-
valenced comments, especially during discussion periods, consisted of
jurors either consulting with one another about the identities of peo-
ple sitting in the courtroom audience (e.g., asking if others thought
someone was related to one of the parties) or reporting to others that
they had just seen or passed someone outside of court (e.g., in the
hallway or on an elevator) with no further comment (except a few
instances in which jurors said that they had felt nervous or awkward
92. Id. This is also a slightly inflated figure because it reflects a count of targets observed in
the offstage-thus, if a juror remarked on having seen the attorney talking to the client during a
break, we entered that as an offstage observation about both the attorney and the client. About
10% of the total comments reflected these multi-target remarks. Id.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id.
96. For a definition of valenced coding, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 47.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 15 n.5. Jurors also made six additional comments about the judge during delibera-
tions or in the post-verdict conversation they had; only one of these was valenced (a criticism of
one judge who, a jury believed, did not do enough to control the behavior of a defense witness
who was sitting in the audience). Id.
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over the encounter). 100 These latter comments explain why a far
larger proportion of non-valenced offstage comments was based on
observations out of court (37% observed outside the courtroom),
compared with valenced comments (just 15% were based on out-of-
court observations; in the whole data set, 26% of observations ,kere
from out-of-court encounters).10 1
The remaining 49% percent of our comments were judged to favor
one side or the other. 10 2 Valenced remarks were particularly preva-
lent during deliberations: sixty-seven of the seventy-two deliberation
remarks (93%) were valenced, as compared to just 33% of comments
(n = 65) from discussions during trial.10 3 Roughly half of the thirty-
one comments (n = 16) that jurors exchanged in post-deliberation pe-
riods (after they had signed the verdict sheet but before they went to
court to announce the verdict) were valenced.10 4
The substance of valenced remarks showed distinct patterns. First,
valenced remarks from the deliberation periods were far less likely to
favor the plaintiff than the defense-75% of valenced deliberation re-
marks about the offstage supported the defense.10 5 Second, the re-
marks across different cases exhibited consistent themes. For
example, jurors talked about whether a plaintiff who requested future
damages in the case still appeared to be injured, they discussed how
people reacted to other people's testimony or argument (and what
this meant for the credibility of either the person testifying or the per-
son being observed), and they also used the offstage to offer addi-
tional insights and suggest background stories about the people they
observed.10 6 We give more detail in Part III.C on these themes as we
show that they are similar to those found in appellate decisions from
non-criminal trials.107
In summary, across a number of cases, jurors talked about activity
occurring in the offstage, and, especially during deliberations, they
typically offered these comments to make a point that favored one
party or the other. At the same time, the total frequency of valenced
offstage remarks-especially those offered as part of deliberations-
was exceedingly small. This suggests that the offstage either did not
frequently draw the attention of jurors or, if the jurors did attend to
100. Id.
101. Id. at 47.
102. Id.
103. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 14.
104. Id. at 47.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. at 16-24.
107. See infra notes 127-205 and accompanying text.
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offstage behavior, they often chose not to share what they had seen
with their fellow jurors. Thus, in these civil cases, we find little evi-
dence for the proposition that individual jurors' access to the offstage
of a trial takes a jury's discussions and deliberations away from focus-
ing on and considering the case that was formally presented to it.
2. How Do Jurors Treat Offstage Information?
Our data offer a rich and unique view of the topics juries discuss
during deliberations. These conversations, however, do not necessa-
rily reveal the dynamics of individual jurors' decision-making
processes.108 We could not peer into individual minds and observe the
specific factors that led them to favor one side or another.10 9 Instead,
we directly observed the issues that juries found worthy of discussing
and debating-in other words, we know what topics jurors put on the
table in order to decide the case. 1 0 This allowed us to track how the
jury as a group treated offstage information.'
We looked at several aspects of deliberations to identify how much
attention offstage information received during deliberations and to
what effect.112 First, we counted the turns of conversation devoted to
offstage topics, including follow-up discussion or debate about the re-
marks and their implications. 1 3 We found that juries devoted very
little time in deliberation to offstage discussions, with just 1.5% of all
conversation turns in deliberation spent on offering or commenting on
offstage observations. 11 4 Thus, not only was the absolute number of
remarks low, but in addition, talk about the observations did not dom-
inate the floor of the jury room.115
Second, we examined the patterns of valenced remarks jurors made
before they commented on the offstage.1 1 6 If jurors offering offstage
remarks had already made a number of remarks favoring one side,
then it was less likely that their offstage comments played a decisive
role in group discussions; that is, this pattern would indicate that the
jurors offering the remarks had lobbied for a given position and out-
come even without references to the offstage.1 7 In contrast, if a juror
108. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 24-25.
109. Id. at 25.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 25-37.
113. Id. at 26-27.
114. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 26-27.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id. at 29-31.
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expressed more mixed views prior to the offstage remark, then con-
ceivably there was more room for the offstage comment either to shift
the balance of how that juror talked about the case to the group or to
shift the group's trajectory of discussion. 118 In deliberations, jurors'
comments about the offstage were disproportionately about the plain-
tiff and were predominantly negative in valence (i.e., favored the de-
fense); 119 therefore, we focused on the percentage of pro-defense
comments offered just prior to an offstage critique of the plaintiff.120
Among jurors who had offered at least one valenced remark before
referring to an offstage observation, on average fully 77% of their pre-
vious valenced remarks were, like the offstage remark, pro-defense.12'
Thus, the tenor of offstage remarks was quite consistent with positions
the jurors had already taken. We next looked carefully at all of the
cases in which the balance of remarks was below this mean amount
(i.e., the cases in which jurors were seemingly more "open" to offstage
evidence). 122 We found no indication that the offstage observation af-
fected the jurors' (or jury's) ultimate positions. For example, in two
cases, jurors offered offstage comments to suggest that the plaintiff
did not seem particularly injured; however, these jurors made these
remarks after the group had already decided not to award any money
for current or future damages. 23 By looking closely at the context of
the cases, we also found that some remarks emerged during lulls in
deliberation (e.g., the group was passing time while writing up a ques-
tion to send to the judge or passing around exhibits for each juror to
examine).1 24 Although we cannot say that these remarks failed to in-
fluence the other jurors who heard them, they were not linked to any
shifts in the way the group talked about substantive issues, nor did
these groups return to the remarks when the lull was done. 125
118. Id. at 31.
119. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
120. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 30.
121. Id. We measured the pattern of prior valenced remarks in two ways. One tallied across
comments and reflected the proportion of all pro-defense comments by jurors making offstage
remarks. Second, because jurors contributed different numbers of valenced comments (some
contributed many, some only a few), we also examined the proportion of pro-defense comments
for each individual juror who made offstage remarks, and then we averaged these values to-
gether. Both produced the 77% value, but the proportion was somewhat lower (67%) when we
included a handful of jurors who had made no valenced comments before offering an offstage
remark. Id. at 30 n.8.
122. Id. at 31-35.
123. Id. at 31.
124. Id. at 32-33.
125. Id.
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Finally, verdict patterns offered no hint that offstage comments
changed case outcomes. Although valenced offstage remarks offered
during deliberation were disproportionately unfavorable to the plain-
tiff's case, we found no association between the likelihood of a verdict
for the plaintiff and the presence of an offstage comment. 126
In sum, offstage remarks consumed little of the jurors' deliberation
time, the remarks were typically consistent with positions jurors had
already expressed, and the presence of an offstage remark about the
plaintiff during deliberations did not predict jury verdicts. Thus, by
these measures, offstage observations played only a small role in de-
liberations, and remarks typically supplemented and bolstered posi-
tions jurors had already expressed. We found no evidence that juries
gave undue weight to offstage observation during deliberations.
C. The Types of Offstage Remarks that Jurors-and Judges-Make
Although offstage observations were few in number and although
the juries did not focus on them during deliberations, there were sev-
eral consistent themes in the juror remarks, and some types of obser-
vations appeared in multiple cases.127 In this Section, we show that
the themes we observed in the Arizona data set can also be found in
appellate rulings that revisit the decisions of trial courts and adminis-
trative law judges. 128 As the rulings make clear, reviewing courts in
non-criminal cases have varied in their evaluations of how appropriate
or inappropriate it was for judges' final opinions to have incorporated
offstage observations.
1. Plaintiffs' Level of Functioning and "Sit and Squirm" Tests
Roughly one-third of the cases in our data set (n = 18, or 36%)
included comments made during deliberations, pre-deliberation dis-
cussions, or both that focused on how injured (or, more typically, not
injured) the plaintiff seemed to be. 129 In two of these cases, the re-
marks were brief asides and were, in fact, irrelevant to the case be-
cause the plaintiff was not claiming any ongoing injury.1 30 However,
the remaining sixteen cases about plaintiff's level of injury at the time
of the trial constituted fully 48% of the thirty-three cases in which
126. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 35-37. We looked both at whether the plaintiff won any
award, as well as whether the plaintiff won more than a minimal award (greater than $3000, an
amount likely necessary to cover trial costs) or won an amount beyond that which a defendant
had conceded was reasonable (i.e., in cases in which liability was uncontested). Id. at 36.
127. Id. at 16-24.
128. See infra notes 129-205 and accompanying text.
129. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 16.
130. Id.
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plaintiffs asked for future damages; hence these comments were rele-
vant to determinations the jury needed to make.131 Jurors made gen-
eral remarks (e.g., the plaintiff "walks around real good"), as well as
specific critiques (e.g., a plaintiff said she continues to feel pain, but
she did not grimace once during the trial). 132 In two cases, the plain-
tiffs or their attorneys had at one point said that the plaintiff could not
sit for long periods without needing to move around; jurors in both of
these cases remarked that the plaintiff sat with apparent ease and
comfort while at the party's table. 133 In one of these cases, the plain-
tiff failed to meet multiple expectations from jurors about how an in-
jured person is likely to act; apart from appearing to remain
comfortably seated for long periods, jurors in this case also claimed
that the plaintiff did not limp when he was outside of the courtroom
and that he was able to get up from his seat with little trouble.134
In cases in which administrative or trial judges have had to decide
whether someone is currently suffering from an injury-specifically
worker's compensation and disability cases-judges have also looked
to whether a person's in-court demeanor reflects that of an injured
person. For example, in a worker's compensation action in Louisiana,
a plaintiff claimed that he had become totally and permanently dis-
abled after a car chassis fell on him, injuring his back. 135 The defen-
dant appealed the trial court's decision for the plaintiff.1 36 Although
expert testimony conflicted, 37 the plaintiff offered numerous lay wit-
nesses to testify that he had previously been healthy and hard-work-
ing, but now could do no work, was often in bed, and frequently lived
in pain.1 38 In arriving at a judgment for the plaintiff, the trial judge
wrote:
Plaintiff was in court during court hours for more than two days
and I observed him as closely as I could for the sole purpose of
catching him off his pose, if he was posing. I did not catch him. He
consistently kept at all times an expression of discomfort.
Plaintiff maintains that he still has pain, and to me his expression
and actions show it.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 16-17.
133. Id. at 17-18.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Pringle v. Milner-Fuller, Inc., 7 So. 2d 253, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1942).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 254.
138. Id. at 255.
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The lay testimony in this case is so convincing to me that I am
forced to let it tilt the scales in his favor. 139
The reviewing court repeated the above information to show that the
judge had given "great weight" to the plaintiff's demeanor in court. 140
Significantly, the appellate court offered no negative comment about
the judge's attempt to "catch" the defendant, instead concluding that
they had no reason to disturb the judge's ruling.141
Courts reviewing social security disability cases have refined what
types of in-court observation are acceptable. In Tyler v. Weinberger, a
district court reviewed an administrative law judge's ruling in a disa-
bility case. 142 The plaintiff in Tyler had a long history of back injuries
and asked for social security disability benefits because he claimed
that pain and fatigue usually made it impossible for him to sit for more
than an hour without needing to change positions and to rest. 143 Med-
ical examinations and tests confirmed damage to his spine and other
infirmities. 144 In denying the plaintiff's application for disability, the
judge stated:
He testified quite definitely that he could not sit down for more
than an hour, due to unbearable pain. However, he sat in the hear-
ing room for one hour and 45 minutes without even changing posi-
tion, grimacing, standing, or exhibiting any other manifestation
usually expected from those in severe pain. Thus, from this stand-
point alone, the Administrative Law Judge feels that the claimant
grossly exaggerated the extent of his pain and the degree of his be-
ing uncomfortable from the pain.145
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the judge created a "'sit and
squirm' index" of observable symptoms that the plaintiff had to dis-
play in order to be found disabled.' 46 The district judge reviewing the
case distinguished two types of in-court observation. The court ruled
that if the judge had rejected "otherwise relevant testimony on pain
and suffering because of plaintiff's failure to exhibit what the Judge,
independent of plaintiff's representations, considered observable
manifestations usually expected from those in severe pain," then this
was improper. 147 The district court elaborated:
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Pringle, 7 So. 2d at 255.
142. Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Va. 1976).
143. Id. at 783.
144. Id. at 782-83.
145. Id. at 784.
146. Id. at 789.
147. Id.
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Clearly, a "sit and squirm" index, as plaintiff calls it, applied by a
Judge who is not a medical expert will not only result in unreliable
conclusions when observing claimants with honest intentions, but
may encourage claimants to manufacture convincing observable
manifestations of pain or, worse yet, discourage them from exercis-
ing their right to appear before an Administrative Law Judge for
fear that they may not appear to the unexpert eye to be as bad as
they feel.' 48
On the other hand, the district court ruled that "[t]here is no error
of law"'149 when a judge bases conclusions on what the judge observes
of a plaintiff "in light of plaintiff's testimony as to the observable
symptoms" he exhibits.'50 In other words, judges cannot impose their
own general notion of what people are supposed to look like when
they are in pain for the purpose of disregarding other evidence of
pain-related disability. However, in-court observation from offstage
regions is appropriate for determining credibility when judges con-
sider the consistency between specific claims the plaintiff makes and
how that person behaves during the hearing.151
Other courts considering disability appeals have followed Tyler in
holding that in-court observation should not, by itself, determine
whether or not someone is in pain. For instance, in McDonald v.
Schweiker,152 an administrative law judge who denied benefits to an
applicant noted that the plaintiff concentrated and seemed undis-
tracted by pain during the hearing and that she could easily rise from
her seat. 53 In reversing this decision, a district court noted that, given
the variability in people's reactions to pain, a sit and squirm require-
ment "may or may not be of value."'1 54 When there is no evidence of
"malingering and substantial clinical evidence" that the plaintiff suf-
fers from conditions that cause pain (as was true in that case), it is
"unreasonable" to rely solely on the judge's own observations.155
148. Tyler, 409 F. Supp. at 789.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. In Tyler, the district court ruled that although it was legally permissible to look for consis-
tency between testimony and behavior in the hearing, the judge's accounting of the plaintiff's
testimony was unreasonable and inaccurate. Id. at 789-90. The Arizona jurors gave little indica-
tion that they used offstage observation as a singular basis for disbelieving a party. See supra
notes 108-126 and accompanying text. In addition, a number of comments reflected compari-
sons between what a plaintiff (or the plaintiff's attorney) had said and how the plaintiff behaved.
For examples, see supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
152. No. 90-3359, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18250 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 1981).
153. Id. at *13-14.
154. Id. at *23.
155. Id. at *23-24.
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2. How People Respond to Trial Events
A second set of comments in the Arizona dataset discussed reac-
tions that parties or others had to trial events or to the fact that they
were involved in a trial. 156 Jurors variously talked about whether peo-
ple seemed to be under stress,157 how people reacted to a particular
piece of trial, testimony (e.g., a juror looked at how an overweight
plaintiff reacted when an expert testified about whether the plaintiff's
weight likely exacerbated the injury), 58 instances when people cried
in the offstage, 159 and whether offstage actors were coaching front-
stage people. 160 Jurors in several different cases also commented on
instances in which parties or others used the offstage to mouth exple-
tives, roll their eyes, or scoff at testimony. 161 The statements in this
category reflected jurors' interest in identifying seemingly spontane-
ous-and, therefore, authentic-reactions to events (i.e., how people
handled the situation), but jurors often criticized people who did not
maintain composure during the trial, especially if they appeared to be
attempting to communicate "back channel" with the jury (e.g., by eye
rolling at a jury while someone testified). 162 Two jurors in one case
discussed how the defendant, an owner of a business where an acci-
dent occurred, was "smug" based on his responses to how others
testified:
#7: Yeah, he's very smug and he was laughing and shaking his head
and going, "How are you the expert"? ....
#8: And he's supposed to make a good impression.
#7: That's the problem, he's not supposed to make an impression
and the worst part of it is he reminds me of an old boss I had. I
can't think about that.
#8: That's your civic duty to put that away and just look at the facts.
#7: You know, there he is just sitting there and I think that says
something about him and something about how he runs his busi-
ness. Maybe it doesn't mean a lot but it means something. 163
The observations of the Arizona jurors again were mirrored in in-
ferences drawn by judges about people's character and credibility
based on observations noting how trial participants reacted to other
156. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 19-23.
157. Id. at 19.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 19-20.
160. Id. at 20.
161. Id. at 21-22.
162. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 20-22.
163. Id. at 22. It is worth noting that this comment appeared during the pre-deliberation
discussion periods for this case. Neither juror who made the comment, nor any other juror,
reiterated the remark during deliberations.
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people's testimony and argument. In Leslie v. Leslie, an appellate
court supported the conclusions of a lower court and a master as-
signed to hear a divorce case.164 The husband's claims centered on his
wife's poor treatment and verbal abuse of him.165 The master found
that "defendant's demeanor on and off the stand, in the hearing room
(especially during plaintiffs testimony)" had revealed her contempt
and disdain for her husband. 166 The appellate court quoted with ap-
proval the lower court's rationale for deferring to the master's
judgment:
He was able throughout the proceedings to observe and study the
behavior of both of the parties and their demeanor on and off the
witness stand; many times such observations may well be more con-
vincing and persuasive in drawing conclusions from the evidence
than the actual testimony of the parties themselves. 167
Fifty years later, in Morgan v. Department of Financial & Profes-
sional Regulations,168 a clinical psychologist appealed the suspension
of his license, which had been suspended because the psychologist had
behaved in a sexually inappropriate way with a client. 169 The appel-
lant argued that the administrative law judge (ALJ) improperly used
courtroom behavior as a basis for judging credibility. 170 The ALJ had
noted that the plaintiff blurted out comments, rolled his eyes, shook
his head, made "dismissive faces," and said "bull shit" while other wit-
nesses testified. 171 The ALJ interpreted the behavior as having
"clearly suggested that perhaps [the plaintiff] was not respectful of
other people," which, the ALJ pointed out, was essentially part of the
accusation against him.172 Citing Wigmore in support of the notion
that such information is not "high quality evidence of credibility," 173
the reviewing court nevertheless held that the ALJ acted properly.174
The court drew on precedent (including United States v. Schuler175) to
conclude that the critical issue was that Morgan testified. 176 Because
Morgan took the stand and denied unprofessional conduct, "his credi-
164. Leslie v. Leslie, 132 A.2d 379, 379 (Pa. 1957).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Morgan v. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulations, 871 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
169. Id. at 181-82.
170. Id. at 191.
171. Id. at 185.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 191.
174. Morgan, 871 N.E.3d at 191.
175. 813 F.2d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 1987).
176. Morgan, 871 N.E.2d at 191.
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bility was clearly in issue, and the ALJ was not in error to take note of
his demeanor while sitting in the courtroom. '177
3. Background Information and Additional Details
Finally, a few jurors' offstage comments in the Arizona data set
seemed design to "fill in" details of people or their stories.178 Some of
these were brief statements that offered general impressions of people
who were observed offstage-for example, that an audience member
(the wife of witness) seems "nice" or that, even before testifying, a
witness struck one juror as a "shyster." 179 In three other cases, jurors
offered somewhat more elaborate pictures of people they observed.
For example, during post-deliberation talk, one juror said that she
hoped an elderly defendant did not still drive; another juror noted
that the juror had seen the defendant walking out of the parking
lot.180 In a different case, jurors remarked that the plaintiff's children
sat on the "other side" of the courtroom from the plaintiff and that
the plaintiff's daughter had a conversation with the defense attor-
ney.181 During deliberations, a juror in another case responded to fel-
low jurors' claims that the plaintiff is an "emotional person" and
"overexcited":
177. Id.
178. Rose et al., supra note 9, at 23-24.
179. Id. at 24.
180. Id. at 23. In this instance, the juror who had initially expressed concerns about the defen-
dant driving clarified exactly what the offstage observer saw:
#8: t hope he doesn't drive anymore.
#4: He does. I saw him go in the parking lot over there.
#8: Does he drive in?
#4: I have no idea. I just see him walking out of the parking lot. (The jurors then
switched to a different topic.)
Quotation from Arizona Transcripts (on file with the authors).
181. Quotation from Arizona Transcripts (on file with the authors). Interestingly, the signifi-
cance of the observation, which occurred during deliberations, appears to be based on the as-
sumption that the seating rules in court cases are similar to those followed in weddings:
#5: I kept looking to see if his daughter was going to be in there because she was
mentioned....
#7: They sat at the other side.
#5: They sat on the other side.
#8: They sat on the, this side, or that side?
#2: If it's the defendant's party they sit on the defendant's side, if it's the plaintiff's
party, they sit on the plaintiff's side.
#4: Usually that is true, but that she (the daughter) was talking to the defendant's
lawyer.
#8: Yes, I did see that.
#4: Yeah, I picked up on that, too.
Id. The jurors in the above case moved on immediately to a different line of discussion.
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#5: Well, I don't know if, how you guys felt about it, but when I seen
her husband, it's like she was intimidated by him. She seems like a
very shy, very intimidated little girl and he seemed like he was
rough and I think she might have had an anxiety attack over the fact
that, "wait till he finds out" she had an-
#2: Accident.
#5: -accident. Maybe, I don't know, maybe she's not supposed to be
running around . . . and she was out late at night (other jurors
laugh). 182
Two appellate rulings offer similar examples of judges generating
stories and profiles of people through offstage observation. In Kovacs
v. Szentes, t83 a trial judge heard a case in which a man sued his
mother-in-law for allegedly breaking up his marriage and alienating
the affections of his wife, ruling in favor of the husband.1 84 Drawing
on what the trial judge observed of the parties in court, the judge
claimed that not only did the defendant and the plaintiff's wife refuse
to play with the child of the plaintiff (they "spurned him and seemed
to take pleasure in repulsing him"), but also, "it was very evident that
she (the plaintiff's wife) was under the domination of the defendant
and that it was fairly apparent that, if left to themselves, the plaintiff
and his wife would get along together."'185 The appellate court ruled
that the judge erred in considering this information. 18 6 Echoing the
standard cited by Levenson that fact finders are no longer compurga-
tors,187 the court ruled that the trial court had "made of himself a
witness" and in doing so, he was "unsworn" with no opportunity given
to defense to "cross-examine, to offer countervailing evidence, or to
know upon what evidence the decision would be made." 188
In United Insurance Co. of America v. NLRB, an insurance com-
pany maintained that the debit collector agents it used were indepen-
dent contractors, and that, therefore, the company did not have to
engage in collective bargaining with the union that was attempting to
organize the collector agents.189 A trial examiner ruled against
United Insurance and in favor of the union; the NLRB upheld this
ruling. 190 The trial examiner based his findings, in part, on having ob-
served the demeanor of witnesses in the hearing room and finding that
182. Id.
183. Kovacs v. Szentes, 33 A.2d 124 (Conn. 1943).
184. Id. at 125.
185. Id. at 125-26.
186. Id. at 126.
187. Levenson, supra note 7, at 615.
188. Kovacs, 33 A.2d at 126.
189. United Ins. Co. of Am. v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, NLRB v.
United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
190. Id.
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the agents who testified in favor of United Insurance did not "display
or appear to have attributes of independence. " 191 In a footnote, the
examiner defended his observation:
[T]here appears to be no good reason for excluding demeanor in the
courtroom when the witness is not on the stand and where it is
clearly observable as in this case .... Without attempting to detail
the basis for this necessarily subjective finding, and allowing for an
independent contractor's possible concern over renewal or termina-
tion of his contract, I can here declare that I observed a uniform and
marked deference by agents toward supervisors and company offi-
cials which, without obsequiousness but beyond the sometimes elu-
sive requirements of courtesy, is decently characteristic of common
attitudes between employees and supervisors; and which in such
uniformity differs from the normally observable attitudes between
independent contracting parties.' 92
In granting the insurance company's request to set aside the
NLRB's order, the Seventh Circuit found that "the off-the-stand ap-
pearance or conduct of the witness may properly be considered in de-
termining his credibility when it constitutes an observable physical
fact. 1 93 Though the court did not supply examples of observable
physical facts, the court contrasted "observable physical fact" with
"such subtle manifestations of human reactions as 'obsequiousness'
and 'courtesy."' 194 The court noted that the examiner necessarily ap-
plied his own views about what factors signify the typical relationship
between employers and employees versus between those engaged in
independent contracting, and the court held that this was not a proper
basis for a credibility assessment. 195 The court further suggested that
it could not be sure that the NLRB's determination had not been
tainted by the observation, even though the NLRB disavowed any re-
liance on it.196
The United States Supreme Court subsequently overruled the Sev-
enth Circuit.1 97 Although the Court made no mention of the trial ex-
aminer's use of off-the-stand observation to inform credibility, it held
that "the Board's determination was a judgment made after a hearing
with witnesses and oral argument had been held and on the basis of
written briefs. Such a determination should not be set aside just be-
191. Id. at 324.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. Although the court did not elaborate, it possibly had in mind the types of information
that Wigmore referred to as "real evidence." See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
195. United Ins., 371 F.2d at 324.
196. Id.
197. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
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cause a court would, as an original matter, decide the case the other
way." 198
4. Summary
As we noted in discussing the references to offstage behavior by
jurors, the remarks were sometimes off-hand mentions, and we found
little indication that those remarks played a substantial role in deci-
sion making. In contrast, because judicial opinions explicitly provide
justifications for rulings, the opinions more clearly describe the role an
offstage observation played in a decision. Yet even though the data
sources are quite different, the few cases that have considered the pro-
priety of using the offstage areas of trials show that judges and juries
are both drawn to the offstage on occasion and that the two groups
use the offstage to inform similar issues.
Apart from showing common uses of offstage areas, the review also
demonstrates a mix of reactions from reviewing courts on this issue,
and how they struggle to demarcate lines that might distinguish ac-
ceptable from unacceptable offstage observation. 199 The Seventh Cir-
cuit ruling in United Insurance is a good example of the ambivalence
toward offstage observations that reviewing courts appear to ex-
press.200 Although the opinion clearly rebuked the trial examiner's
behavior, it also imagined counter-factual scenarios in which offstage
observations could legitimately inform credibility-that is, when ob-
servations concerned an "observable physical fact. '20 1 Nonetheless,
as Tyler 20 2 shows, even some types of "physical" manifestations of
symptoms-people's body positions and facial expressions-risk be-
ing used impermissibly if they contribute to a "sit and squirm in-
dex. '203 At the other extreme, one court viewed the offstage area as
an appropriate and legitimate site for observation: "demeanor on and
off the witness stand ... may well be more convincing and persuasive
198. Id. at 260.
199. It bears mentioning that courts are divided over instances of in-court offstage observation
(e.g., how a plaintiff sat through a disability hearing, or how a party reacts to the testimony of
others). Given that jurors are instructed to avoid contact or interaction with people outside of
the courtroom, we would expect that any references to out-of-court behavior would generally be
considered improper, especially because out-of-court encounters will not give all jurors an equal
opportunity to see the behavior in question.
200. United Ins. of Am. v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, NLRB v. United Ins.
Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
201. Id. at 324.
202. Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Va. 1976).
203. Id. at 789-90. A "sit and squirm index" refers to a judge-created test that puts litigants in
the position of having to demonstrate certain physical expressions or risk having their assertions
of pain discredited. Id.
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in drawing conclusions from the evidence than the actual testimony of
the parties themselves. '20 4 Morgan suggests that, although offstage
observations likely do not produce high quality information, when
someone has testified, his or her behavior away from the witness stand
is essentially fair game. 205
As we next discuss, the legal ambivalence about the value and pro-
priety of these observations, together with the other findings from the
study of offstage behavior among Arizona jurors we have observed,
have implications for the desirability of taped trials and the form that
the optimal taped trial might take.
IV. Is THE POTENTIAL Loss OF OFFSTAGE ACCESS
ACTUALLY A "Loss"?
As we consider whether something is "lost" when people do not
have access to a live trial, we begin by noting that our review of appel-
late cases suggests that the question is not easily disposed of through
simple appeals to normative and legal standards. Although we will
never know how a reviewing court would look at the types of conver-
sations that the Arizona jurors had about the offstage, if we take the
appellate rulings on judicial behavior as a guide, then the Arizona jury
deliberations did not produce observations from the offstage that
would be viewed by all courts as legally erroneous.206 The question of
whether a filmed trial would likely reduce juror bias would be easier
to answer had our data revealed that when the jurors talked about
offstage activity, they focused disproportionately on information that
all would agree should not have been shared with others. This would
have pointed to a clear advantage to taped trials (i.e., reducing obvi-
ously improper influences). Likewise, as we have already suggested,
our data did not support other normative concerns, such as a fear that
jurors cannot be trusted to keep offstage information in perspective
and give it a limited role in deliberations. 20 7
Although not offering clear normative answers, as an empirical
matter, our analysis provides insight into what fact finders observe
during trials and, therefore, what is likely to be "missed" without ac-
cess to offstage areas. The consistency between the themes in the jury
204. Leslie v. Leslie, 132 A.2d 379, 381 (Pa. 1957).
205. Morgan v. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation, 871 N.E.2d 178, 191 (I11. App. Ct. 2007).
206. As noted above, we refer generally to the types of in-court observations jurors offered.
See supra note 199. Compared to out-of-court encounters, in-court observation dominated the
remarks that jurors made. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. In deliberations, in-court
observation was even more predominant. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 47 (showing that sixty-
three of seventy-one offstage remarks during deliberations concerned in-court observation).
207. See supra notes 108-126 and accompanying text.
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deliberations and in judicial rulings suggests that both judges and ju-
rors sometimes look to whether people sit, stand, or walk in ways that
are consistent with how they describe their current injuries-espe-
cially when a party makes specific claims about not being able to en-
gage in certain kinds of activities (e.g., sitting for long periods).
Decision makers are interested in people's composure during trial and
how they react to what others say during testimony or argument. In
some instances, as in Morgan20 8 or in the example from an Arizona
case regarding an allegedly "smug" defendant,20 9 the party being ob-
served likely invited such attention through overly dramatic gestures
and expressions of outrage. In other cases, like Leslie v. Leslie,210 a
decision maker seemed to seek out a party's reactions to test a specific
claim (e.g., the husband says his wife was contemptuous of him; how
does she act when he testifies?). 211 Finally, decision makers look not
only to the behavior of a given individual, but also how people behave
in relation to one another, for example, whether a child sits near a
parent, 212 whether someone seems "intimidated" by a spouse,2 13 or
whether someone is under the "domination" of a mother.214 With
only the area around the witness stand, the judge, and perhaps an at-
torney lectern visible to decision makers, all of these sources-other
than perhaps information about who is sitting at a party's table-are
vulnerable to being inaccessible in a taped trial.
Is this a substantial loss? Judging only from the observable indica-
tors we had about the groups' attention to offstage material in the
discussions and deliberations (i.e., frequency of comments, time spent
on deliberation, the consistency between offstage remarks and other
valenced comments, and verdicts), our best guess is no. Although
most jury trials included some commentary about the offstage, there
was not very much of it, and it had very little observable effect. At the
group level, there seems little to lose by omitting offstage access be-
cause offstage activity plays such a small role in the group decision-
making process. It seems likely, for example, that an appellate court's
understanding of the information that most influenced a jury's verdict
208. Morgan, 871 N.E.2d at 178.
209. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 22; see also supra note 163 and accompanying text.
210. Leslie v. Leslie, 132 A.2d 379, 381 (Pa. 1957).
211. In the Arizona data, there were also instances in which jurors told others that they delib-
erately looked over to the offstage areas to see how a party would respond to particular testi-
mony-for example, when an expert said that a plaintiffs weight may contribute to the injury, a
juror watched how the plaintiff responded. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 19.
212. See id. at 23; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
213. See Rose et al., supra note 9, at 23; see also supra note 182 and accompanying text.
214. Kovacs v. Szentes, 33 A.2d 124, 126 (Conn. 1943).
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would change little if all they saw only the front sections of a court-
room through a camera's eye. Likewise, for filmed trials presented to
juries, the "story" that the jury group puts together about the case
would probably be largely the same with and without access to the
offstage.
As we have indicated, however, we observed how juries decided
cases, which is not the same as observing how jurors come to conclu-
sions. With respect to individuals, our review makes clear that some
individual jurors felt that some types of information were worth shar-
ing with others; we also know that in a few instances, some trial judges
and magistrates have justified their opinions through reference to the
offstage. Thus, we know that when the offstage areas of a trial are
available, some people will use them as one way to "cross-check"
what they hear with what they see.215 What we do not know is how
much of a difference such use made in the individual viewpoints these
jurors formed in the trial. For example, we do not know how much
value people attached to the opportunity to see people both on and
off the witness stand and, therefore, how they might have felt without
access to this region.
We know that jurors are strongly motivated to reach the correct
decision, and when given the opportunity (e.g., through question-ask-
ing), they routinely find ways to further their understanding of issues
they believe have not been sufficiently developed from the evidence
given.2 16 Thus, it may be that live trials and the opportunity to view
offstage behavior in the courtroom reassures jurors that they have
been provided with appropriate input for reaching reasonable deci-
sions. Moreover, and importantly, we do not know from these data if,
for example, a filmed trial with a far more restricted view of a court-
room would alter the attentiveness of jurors to the trial or jurors'
sense of certainty about their positions and the perceived coherence
of their beliefs. We do not know if being a juror in a filmed trial
215. In a prior examination of how jurors make use of the opportunity to ask questions of
witnesses, we showed that a substantial proportion (42%) of juror questions reflected a process
we called "cross checking," which refers to jurors' interest in "evidence from disinterested wit-
nesses or non-witness sources of probative information to compare that information with claims
from other sources." Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & Sven Smith,
Juror Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1956-57
(2006). For an examination of people's more general attempts to compare verbal and non-verbal
behavior, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
216. See, e.g., Diamond et al., supra note 215, at 1954-61 (discussing types of questions jurors
ask in order to create a coherent account of what happened in the case).
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would reduce a sense of satisfaction compared to being a juror in a
live trial.217 Other studies are necessary to answer these questions.
Our data demonstrate that both individual jurors and judges use the
offstage to catch a party "off his pose, if he was posing. '218 Courts
deciding whether or not to make greater use of pre-recorded presen-
tation for fact finders will have to consider how to balance, on the one
hand, potential losses in people's attentiveness when watching tapes
as compared to live action and their interest in seeing parties and trial
participants in the broadest possible context with, on the other hand,
any conveniences and advantages that pre-recorded trials may of-
fer.219 At the same time, given that offstage insights and discussions
do not greatly affect group deliberations and jury verdicts, it appears
that at least some of the potential dangers of live trials may be over-
stated. For example, we found no empirical evidence that should lead
courts to feel pressure to turn to pre-recorded trials as a way to "pro-
tect" civil jurors from improper and undue influences from offstage
activity. Further, because we examined just one possible implication
of switching to a recorded format-that is, the possible loss of access
to the offstage-we can make no pronouncement on whether, more
generally, a controlled taped trial can substitute for judgments
reached in response to a live trial. Far more needs to be known about
judgments based on live versus taped presentations.
At this point, the most promising prospect for the use of taped trials
is for appellate review rather than fact finding. On the benefit side,
tape-recordings of trials would give the reviewing courts more infor-
mation than a transcript does (e.g., how a juror answered a question,
how someone testified, a judge's tone when issuing a ruling, or an at-
torney's emotion and manner before a jury).22 As our data suggest,
the loss in the opportunity to capture the offstage would likely have
217. In a rare examination of the difference between live and videotaped presentation of trial
information, researchers recruited jurors from a courthouse and randomly assigned them to ei-
ther view a single live trial (in a large group) or to watch the same trial via videorecording.
MILLER & FONTES, supra note 5, at 71. There were only small differences in individual verdict
results across the live and videotaped conditions (the groups did not deliberate). Id. at 71. In
addition, there were also no significant differences in jurors' ratings of their "interest and "moti-
vation" across conditions; however, the direction of the mean showed that the live trial was
somewhat more interesting and motivating than the taped one (4.51 versus 4.24 on a seven-point
scale). Id. at 72. It is possible that any effect on people's motivation is small and difficult to
detect without large samples; Miller and Fontes observed fifty-two jurors in the live condition
and forty-five jurors in the videotaped condition. Id. at 68-69.
218. Pringle v. Milner-Fuller, Inc., 7 So. 2d 253, 255 (La. Ct. App. 1942).
219. See Rothman, supra note 4.
220. See Owen & Mather, supra note 5.
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little effect on the reviewing court's opportunity to see most of the
important information that the fact finders saw and considered when
arriving at their verdicts.
